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MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TERRORISTS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
ROBERTO IRAOLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 2001, a little over two months after the September 1lth attacks,
President George W. Bush signed an executive order authorizing the trial of nonU.S. citizens before military commissions if they were found to be members of al
Qaeda, had engaged in acts of international terrorism aimed at the United States, or
had harbored such persons.' Regulations governing the procedures to be followed
by these commissions were promulgated in March 2002.2
A spirited debate followed President Bush's order approving military
commissions.3 The debate centered on the legal authority supporting the executive
order, as well as its scope and application. This article, which is divided into three
parts, analyzes the legal authority that President Bush relied upon in support of the
order establishing military commissions. 4 First, the article sets forth the background
leading to the issuance of the order and briefly discusses its aftermath. Second, the
article provides a general overview of the history of military commissions. Lastly,
the article discusses the authorities relied upon in the order establishing military
commissions and examines the arguments that have been raised by opponents and
proponents of this measure.

* Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security, Department
of the
Interior. J.D., Catholic University Law School (1983). The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author.
1. See Military Order of November 13, 2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order]. Non-Citizens
As observed by
one commentator:
Trying terrorists before military commissions offers a number of practical advantages over
ordinary civilian trials. First, commissions enable the government to protect classified and other
sensitive national-security information that would have to be disclosed publicly before an Article
III court. Second, ordinary criminal trials would subject court personnel, jurors, and other
civilians to the threat of terrorist reprisals; the military is better suited to coping with these
dangers. And third, military commissions can operate with more flexible rules of evidence,
which would allow the introduction [of] all relevant evidence regardless of whether, for example,
it has been properly authenticated.
Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L,. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405
(2002).
2. See Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21,
2002), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/issues/militarytrials.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002); John Mintz, Tribunal
Rules Aim to
Shield Witnesses; Judges, ProsecutorsMay Be Anonymous, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at
Al. See also Jeffrey
F. Addicott, Military Tribunals Are Constitutional, Mar. 26, 2002, at http:/Ivww.jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/
forumnew51 .php (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (noting that the rules and procedures promulgated
"generally contain
many of the same provisions found in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which applies to U.S. military
personnel when
tried under the [Uniform Code of Military Justice]").
3. CompareCharles W. Gittins, "Military Commissions" Wrong Response to September11,
WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2001, at A16. ("The order exceeds presidential authority, ignores due process and is
unnecessary."); Joel
B. Grossman, Careless with the Constitution, at http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2002) (arguing that
"neither the President's Commander-in-Chief status, nor whatever inherent
powers the Constitution allows him, nor
any act of Congress, has properly authorized these tribunals") with Peter J. Wallison, In Favor
ofMilitary Tribunals,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2002, at 9 ("The protests over the president's decision to
authorize military
tribunals to try terrorists call to mind Barry Goldwater's remark that 'extremism in defense of
liberty is no vice."');
Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin & Darin R. Bartram, Unlawful Belligerency and Its,
Implications Under
InternationalLaw, at http://www.fed-soc.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (noting that unlawful
belligerents or
unlawful combatants "can be processed through a military justice system instead of being tried
by civilian courts").
4. Throughout this article, the terms military commission and military tribunal are used interchangeably.
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II.BACKGROUND
Throughout the past decade, the United States has been the object of several
major terrorist attacks. Initially, the attacks centered on American interests and
property abroad. For example, in June 1996, a truck bomb exploded near the Khobar
Towers military complex in Saudi Arabia killing nineteen Americans and wounding
372 others.5 In August 1998, terrorists bombed the American embassies located in
the cites of Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, resulting in the death of
224 persons, including twelve Americans, and the wounding of 4600 others.6 In
October 2000, terrorists bombed the American destroyer USS Cole in Adan Harbor,
Yemen, killing seventeen sailors.7
Then, on September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden and members of his terrorist
organization al Qaeda perpetrated a series of major attacks on America's mainland'
by hijacking four commercial jetliners and crashing them into the World Trade
Center in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and the Pennsylvania countryside. 9
These attacks, which resulted in the death of more than 3100 persons, prompted a
broader governmental response.' 0 Three days after the attacks, Congress passed a
joint resolution authorizing the use of military force against those responsible" and

5. Press Release, FBI Khobar Towers Release (June 21, 2001), at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrelOl/khobar
.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002). On June 21, 2001, the government returned a 46-count indictment against thirteen
members of the pro-Iranian Saudi Hizballah or "Party of God" in the Eastern District of Virginia, charging
defendants, inter alia, with murder and conspiracy to kill Americans. Id.
6. See Verdict Against Terrorism,WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at Al8. The government's response to these
bombings included criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
and military retaliation. See Muir Ahmed, Bin Laden Moved After Attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2001.
7. See Kamran Khan & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Cole Suspect Turned Over by Pakistan, WASH. POST, Oct.
28, 2001, at Al.
8. In February 1993, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center killing six persons, hospitalizing over a
thousand others, and causing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damages. See United States v. Salameh, 152
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming convictions of defendants on various charges relating to the bombing of the World
Trade Center). See also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000)
(discussing challenges to convictions of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and others for seditious conspiracy to levy war
against the United States and plans to commit urban terrorism in connection with the bombing of the World Trade
Center in 1993).
9. See Michael Grumwald, Bush PromisesRetribution; Military Put on HighestAlert, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 2001, at Al. Bin Laden was charged previously in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in East Africa.
See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 168. An amateur videotape of bin Laden, released on December 13, 2001,
recorded his admission that "'[they] calculated in advance the number of casualties' that would result when the
airliners were crashed into New York's World Trade Center" and that "'[he] was the most optimistic of them all'
in predicting 'who would be killed."' Karen DeYoung & Walter Pincus, In Bin Laden's Own Words, WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 2001, at Al; Walter Pincus & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Says New Tape Points to Bin Laden: Words Suggest
Sept. 11 Planning Role, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2001, at Al. It was also reported that investigators had gathered
evidence showing similarities between the September II attacks and those on the American embassies and the
destroyer USS Cole. See John Solomon, Ashcroft Says Sunday That Religious Groups Could Be Monitored; Senate
Leader Says He Might Support Narrow Tribunals,DRUDGE REPORT, Dec. 3, 2001.
10. See Brooke A. Masters, Invoking Allah, Terror Suspect Enters No Plea; U.S. Judge in Alexandria
Schedules October Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al (noting that the hijacked jets that crashed into the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside killed more than 3100 persons).
11. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Section 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (Sept. 18, 2001). See also Neil A. Lewis, Measure Backing Bush's Use of ForceIs as Broadas a Declaration
of War, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at B7. It has been reported that, under this new campaign, the
government may target terrorists who have killed Americans in prior attacks on America such as the bombing of
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providing forty billion dollars to help cover the cost of rebuilding and military
action. 12 As part of a broader diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military
effort,' 3 the government undertook a course of action intended to enlist the
cooperation and support of other countries in responding to the terrorist attacks.' 4
Domestically, the administration implemented a number of initiatives. On
September 20, 2001, in an address to the nation, President Bush announced the
creation of the Office of Homeland Security."' Three days later, on September 23,
President Bush issued an executive order directing financial institutions to freeze
any assets belonging to fifteen organizations and twelve individuals suspected of
funding terrorists.'6 On October 26, President Bush signed the "USA Patriot Act of
2001" into law, legislation intended to assist authorities in
7 tracking and disrupting
States.'
United
the
in
terrorists
suspected
of
activities
the

the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996. See Rowan Scarborough, US. Plans War on
Terrorists,Not Infrastructure,WASH. TiMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A 13.
12. John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, CongressClears Use of Force, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A4. In
March 2002, President Bush asked Congress for an additional $27.1 billion for military needs and domestic security
as a result of the September 11 attacks. See Dana Milbank, Bush Seeks $27.1 Billion More for Military Security,
Relief Efforts, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at A7.
13. See U.S., E.U. to Share TerroristData, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 4, 2002 (reporting that the European
Union and the United States are expected to reach agreement in 2002 regarding the exchange of personal data on
terror suspects); Bob Woodward, 50 CountriesDetain 360 Suspects at CIA's Behest; Roundup Reflects Aggressive
Efforts of an Intelligence Coalition Viewed as Key to War on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al
(reporting that a "senior White House official said.. .the intelligence coalition is as important as the military and
diplomatic coalitions involved in the war on terrorism"); Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, Bush to Seek Nation's
Support Tonight; First Warplanes Head to TargetedArea; Battle Called "A War of Will and Mind," WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2001, at Al ("Bush and senior administration officials spent another day lining up international support
for military, financial and economic actions that the president said would be designed to locate terrorist leaders, 'get
them out of their caves, get them moving, cut off their finances."'); Henry Kissinger, Destroy the Network, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A31 ("[U]ntil now we have been trying to [combat the network of terrorist organizations]
as a police matter, and now it has to be done in a different way.").
14. See Karen DeYoung, Bush Urges Coalition to Fulfill Its "Duties"; $1 Billion Aid for Pakistan
Announced, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at Al; David E. Sanger & Michael R. Gordon, A Nation Challenged:The
White House; U.S. Takes Steps to Bolster Bloc Fighting Terror,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at Al; Brent Scowcroft,
Build a Coalition, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A24; Jane Perlez, A Nation Challenged:Europeans; Blair and
ChiracHead to U.S.for Talks and a Show of Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 18,2001, at B2; Ben Barber, Powell Sets Up
GlobalAnti-Terror Coalition; U.S. Eyes Strikes at Training Camps, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al.
15. See A Nation Challenged; President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B4. On October 8, 2001, former Pennsylvania Govemor'Tom Ridge was sworn in
as Director of the Office of Homeland Security. Eric Pianin, Ridge Assumes Post Amid Warnings of Possible
Attacks, FBI Warns Public, Private Entities to Observe "HighestState ofAlert," WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2001, at A6.
On June 6, 2002, President Bush proposed that the Office of Homeland Security be changed into a new department
of government, the Department of Homeland Security, and in November 2002, he sigend a Homeland Security Bill
establishing the new department. John Mintz, Homeland Agency Created; Bush Signed Bill to Combine Federal
Functions, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al; Joseph Curl, Bush Wants New Cabinet Post, WASH. TiMES, June
13, 2002, at Al.
16. See Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001); Mike Allen & Paul Blustein, Foreign
Banks Urged to Help Freeze Assets of 27 Entities, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al; John Mintz & David
Hilzenrath, Bush's Target List Draws Path to Bin Laden's Backers; 3 Charities,New Entities Included, but 2
Groups Are Left Off, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A9.
17. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. See Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow,
Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era; U.S. Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001,
at A6.
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Then, on November 13, 2001, interpreting the events of September 11 as acts of
war18 and citing the "'extraordinary emergency"' presented as a result of the attacks
and the possibility that future attacks could "'place at risk the continuity of the
operations of the United States government,"".' 9 President Bush issued an order
empowering him to detain and direct military prosecutions and trials for non-U.S.
citizens who were determined to be members of al Qaeda, had engaged or conspired
to participate in international terrorism, or had harbored such persons. 20 Administration officials maintained that because the United States was in a state of war,21 it was
"important to give the president of the United States the maximum flexibility with
his constitutional authority., 22 After pointing out that there was historical precedent
for this action,23 Vice President Dick Cheney publicly explained:
The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United States
of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of
innocent Americans, men, women, and children, is not a lawful combatant. They
don't deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war. They don't deserve the same
guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going
through the normal judicial process ....
[T]hey will have a fair trial, but it [wi]ll

18. See David E. Sanger, President Defends Secret Tribunals for Terrorism Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 2001 (."The enemy has declared war on us'... [President Bush] said. 'And we must not let foreign enemies use
the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself.'). See also Michael I. Meyerson, The War on Terrorism and the
Constitution, 35 MD. B. J. 16, 19 (2002) (noting, "if this attack were not sufficient by itself to initiate a state of war,
Osama bin Laden had previously declared war against the United States; in 1998, he called for the killing of
American civilians as well as soldiers 'in any country in which it is possible to do it').
19. George Lardner, Jr. & Peter Slevin, Military May Try Terrorism Cases; Bush Cites "Emergency,"
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al.
20. See Military Order, supra note 1.
21. Several months following the attacks, in their prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated:
It is still difficult to fathom the enormity of what happened on September I1th. As time
passes, and the fires finally bum out, Americans will eventually recover from the shock and
horror of what befell our nation that day.
But those who are responsible for our national defense must not lose sight of the fact that
these are not normal times. We have been attacked. We are at war. And we must take the steps
necessary to defend our people, and protect them from further harm.
The September 11th attacks were acts of war. The people who planned and carried out these
attacks are not common criminals-they are foreign aggressors, vicious enemies whose goal
was, and remains, to kill as many innocent Americans as possible.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld & Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Prepared Statements:
Senate Armed Services Committee Military Commissions (Dec. 12,2001), athttp://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
2001 (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
22. DOJ Press Conference, Attorney General John Ashcroft on Military Tribunals for Terrorists (Nov. 14,
2001), at http:llwww.jurist.law.pitt.edulterrorismlterrorismmilash.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
23. See Vice President Cheney on Military Tribunals for Terrorists, Remarks at U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.law.pitt.edu/terrorismlterrorismmilchen.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002). See also
Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (arguing that "[m]ilitary
commissions are consistent with American historical and constitutional traditions" and that the "use of such
commissions has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court"); William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The
Tribunals; Closer Look at New Plan for Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6 (reporting how military
"tribunals have a long international history" and "have been used in this country at least since 1780, when George
Washington appointed a board of officers to try Maj. John Andre, a British spy who slipped behind American lines
to gather information from Benedict Arnold").
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be under the procedures of a military tribunal and rules and regulations to be
24
established in connection with that.
Unlike most other measures undertaken in response to the attacks
on September
11,25 the promulgation of this order generated a good deal of
controversy
both at
home and abroad.26 At home, civil libertarians decried the order
as illustrative of an
administration "totally unwilling to abide by the checks and balances
that are so
central to our democracy. ,21 Some members of the press criticized
the order and
other measures implemented by the administration as "a grave
assault on civil
liberties."2 Lawmakers from both parties criticized the order because
Congress had
29

not been consulted beforehand, and also because the order could become
a model
for use against Americans overseas by foreign governments.3" Overseas,
it was

24. Vice President Cheney on Military Tribunals for Terrorists,
supra note 23.
25. Although the debate surrounding whether those responsible
for the September 1I attacks should be tried
in civilian courts had been taking place for some time, see William
Glaberson, A Nation Challenged:The Law; U.S.
Faces Tough Choices If Bin Laden Is Captured, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (noting that trial of Osama bin
Laden in federal court "would present problems. Among other
things, American courts give defendants access to
much of the government's evidence against them. A federal court
trial could provide terrorists with a road map to
the country's intelligence sources.. giving them an advantage
in the continuing battle against terrorism."); Karen
De Young & Michael Dobbs, Bin Laden: Architect of New Global
Terrorism; Evolving Movement Combines Old
Theology and Modern Technology in Mission Without Borders,
WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at A8 (discussing in
part how prosecution of terrorists enables terrorist organizations
to learn how authorities investigate and pursue
organizations when evidence related to those questions is
presented in open court); John Lancaster & Susan
Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategyfor Coping with Terrorists;
Policy Shift
Would Favor MilitaryAction, Tribunal
over PursuingSuspects Through American Courts, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2001, at A9 ("Stunned by the magnitude
of.. .terrorist attacks, Congress and the White House are reassessing
an approach to fighting terrorism that...
has
favored the tools of law enforcement over those of war."), the
question became more pressing during the week of
November 12, 2001, when Northern Alliance forces, backed
by the United States, advanced across Afghanistan
pushing back the Taliban militia. See Lardner & Slevin, supra
note 19, at A12.
26. See, e.g., Richard A. Greene, Analysis: Military Tribunals,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2002), at http://www.
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid 1701000/1701789.stm
(last visited Oct. 18, 2002) ("Few White
House proposals in the war on terror have caused as much controversy
as President George W. Bush's order to try
suspected terrorists in military tribunals rather than the regular
court system."); Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil,
Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle
for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001
(reporting that officials indicated "Spain w[ould] not extradite
the eight men it ha[d] charged with complicity in the
Sept. 11 attacks unless the United States agree[d] that they would
be tried by a civilian court and not by the military
tribunals envisioned by President Bush").
27. Press Release, ACLU, Bush Order on Military Tribunals
Is Further Evidence That Government Is
Abandoning Democracy's Checks and Balances, Statement of
Laura W. Murphy, Director ACLU Wash. National
Office (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/National Security/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9818&c=
111(last
visited Oct. 18, 2002). See Charles Lane, Terrorism Tribunal
Rights Are Expanded; Draft Specifics Appeals,
Unanimity on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at
Al (reporting that the "expansive wording of Bush's
November 13 order prompted concerns among civil libertarians
and many legal experts that the president had
assumed broad new prosecutorial authority without any specific
authorization from Congress"). See also Statement
of Michael Posner, Executive Director, Lawyer's Committee for
Human Rights (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.lchr
.org/aftersept/mike-statement.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002)
("calling for the immediate revocation of the
President's November 13 Military Order authorizing military
commissions to try terrorists. The Order subverts our
democracy and contradicts basic values the U.S. holds as a nation.").
28. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Liberties Be Damned, WASH.
POST, Nov. 27, 2001, at A13.
29. See Frank J. Murray, Justice to Use FDR Precedentfor Military
Tribunals,WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001,
at Al ("In addition to civil rights concerns, senators of both
parties [we]re unhappy that they were not consulted
before the president's executive order was revealed."); Jess
Bravin, Bush Signs Executive! Order Establishing
Military Tribunals to Try Terror Suspects, WALL ST. J., Nov.
14, 2001, at A3 ("The order was drafted with little
or no consultation with Congress, and some members reacted
harshly.").
30. See George Lardner, Jr., DemocratsBlast Orderon Tribunals;
Senators Told MilitaryTrials Fall Under
President's Power, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A22 (reporting
how Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
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reported that a number of European nations, which had arrested dozens of alleged
terrorists since the attacks, would likely resist extradition requests if they involved

the possibility of a military trial.3

Notwithstanding President Bush's consistently strong public defense of his
decision to establish military tribunals,32 the Senate Judiciary Committee held a
series of hearings in November and December of 2001 in which constitutional
scholars, civil rights and military justice experts, and present and former Department
of Justice officials testified.33 While the hearings were taking place, administration
officials clarified plans for implementation of the order. This led Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) to remark, upon the conclusion
of the hearings, that the Senate's constitutional oversight power had "taken34 a
unilateral edict by the Administration and turned it into a lesson in democracy.,

On December 21, 2001, shortly after the conclusion of the hearings, Zacarias
Moussaoui, a 33-year old French national of Moroccan descent, was charged in

Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) had criticized order, in part because Congress had not been consulted, and in part because
"it
could become a model for use by foreign governments against Americans overseas"); "Dead or Alive "for Bin
Laden, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 2001 (reporting that Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) had concerns about the
"closed dynamic" of proposed tribunals and that Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) indicated Congress should weigh in
on this issue through hearings and possibly legislation). See also Fact Sheet: Past U.S. Criticism of Military
Tribunals, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 28, 2001), at http:/lwww.hrw.orglpress/2001/l l/tribunals I 128.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2002) (arguing that order "may become a model for governments seeking a legal cloak for political
repression").
31. See T.R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send TerrorSuspects to U.S.; Allies Oppose Death Penalty and
Bush's Planfor Secret Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23 (reporting that legal analysts
predicted objections to extraditions requested by the United States of suspects jailed in Britain, Belgium, France,
and Germany likely if military tribunals involved); Sam Dillon & Donald G.McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The
Legal Front;Spain Sets HurdleforExtraditions,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A l (reporting that officials indicated
"Spain w[ould] not extradite the eight men it ha[d] charged with complicity in the Sept. II attacks unless the United
States agree[d] that they would be tried by a civilian court and not by the military tribunals envisioned by President
Bush").
32. See David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; President Defends Secret Tribunals in
Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al (reporting that at a meeting of the country's top prosecutors,
President Bush "portrayed the tribunals and the detentions as necessary byproducts of America's wartime footing.
'The enemy has declared war on us,' he said. 'And we must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to
destroy liberty itself."'); Mike Allen, Bush Defends Orderfor Military Tribunals; PresidentHosts Ramadan Iftar
Dinner, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at A14 ("President Bush said yesterday that his order allowing foreign
terrorism suspects to be tried in military tribunals is 'the absolute right thing to do,' despite fears expressed by both
liberals and conservatives that long-cherished principles of American justice could be compromised.").
33. See Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, The Continuing Debate on the Use
of Military Commissions, Remarks on the Senate Floor (Dec. 14, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/press/
200112/121401a.html (last visited Oct. 18,2002) (hearings held Nov. 28 & Dec. 6, 2001); Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism, Hearing with Attorney General John Ashcroft Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 6, 2001),
at http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/press/200112/120601 html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
34. See Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearing with Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 33.
Following the hearings, Chairman Leahy indicated in remarks before the Senate that anonymous and identified
administration sources had indicated
not intend to use military commissions to try people arrested
that (I) the [a]dministration d[id]
in the United States; (2) these tribunals w[ould] be limited to "foreign enemy war criminals" for
"offenses against the international laws of war"; (3) the military commissions w[ould] follow
the rules of procedural fairness used for trying U.S. military personnel; and (4) the judgments
of the military commissions w(ould] be subject to some form of judicial review.
Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, The Continuing Debate on the Use of Military
Commissions, Remarks on the Senate Floor, supra note 33.
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federal court with conspiring with al Qaeda and bin Laden to murder thousands of
innocent people in connection with the attacks on September 11." That decision
prompted criticism from two senior Democratic senators on the grounds that the
Department of Justice allegedly had failed to discuss Mr. Moussaoui' s prosecution
before a military tribunal with Department of Defense officials.36 One of these
senators was quoted as stating that he "[fleared that the decision to try [Moussaoui]
in the federal district courts of the United States... with all the rights of evidence and
rights of due process.. .may let this big fish get away."37 In response, the General
Counsel for the Department of Defense reportedly stated that "[t]his [wa]s an
illustration of how carefully the president plan[ned] to employ this tool he ha[d]
created.""8
In the meantime, while the debate on military commissions and the rules that
should govern their operation was taking place, U.S. armed forces were capturing
al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners.39 By late January 2002, 158 prisoners had been
brought to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while approximately 270
prisoners remained in Kandahar, Afghanistan.' The transfers of al Qaeda and
Taliban prisoners to Cuba subsequently were suspended for several weeks while the
government expanded the facilities at the base.4 In February 2002, the transfers

35. See Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Indicts Suspect in Sept. II Attacks, Action FormallyLinks
Man to Al Qaeda, States Evidence Against Bin Laden, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al. The trial in that case has
been scheduled for June 2003. See MoussaouiJudge Delays Trial Again, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, at A1.
36. See Walter Pincus, Senators Ask: Why No Tribunal for Suspect?; Democrats Surprise Pentagon
Officials, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2001, at A14. See also Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Indicts Suspect in
Sept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting that "indictment appea's to rule out a military
tribunal for perhaps the most important suspect in U.S. custody").
37. Pincus, supra note 36.
38. Id. The decision to try Mr. Moussaoui in a civilian court came under question again when, at a hearing,
he spoke for fifty minutes calling for the destruction of Israel and the United States and the return of parts of the
world, including Spain, to Muslim rule. See The Moussaoui Problem, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2002, at A20; Brooke
A. Masters, Moussaoui Wants to Be Own Lawyer; Suspect Also Denounces U.S., IsraelDuring Hearing, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 2002, at Al. Expounding on the possibility that the trial of Mr. Moussaoui may turn into a circus,
one commentator has remarked:
Moussaoui clearly doesn't appreciate how fortunate he is to be within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as opposed to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Defense. Or, perhaps he doesn't care. Either way, he's chosen to play games with
people and a process that is designed to protect the rights of unpopular defendants just like him.
Andrew Cohen, On Second Thought, How About a Tribunal,WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at B2. Ultimately, Mr.
Moussaoui may be identified as an enemy combatant and transferred to the custody of the Department of Defense
for prosecution before a military tribunal instead of an Article I court. Susan Schmidt, Prosecutionof Moussaoui
Nears a Crossroad,WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at AS.
39. See Carol Morello, FBI Team to Question Detainees; Marines Take Custody of Captives at Camp
Kandhar,WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A18 (reporting that U.S. Marines had taken custody of fifteen battlefield
prisoners).
40. See Cesar G.Soriano, DetaineeInformation PreventedMore Attacks, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2002, at 5A;
Paisley Dodds, U.S. Authorities Begin InterrogatingPrisonersof Afghan War at Guantanamo,ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Jan. 24, 2002.
41. See Katharine Q. Seelye & Steven Erlanger, A Nation Challenged: Captives; U.S. Suspends the
Transport of Terror Suspects to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at AI (reporting that toal capacity was planned
for 1000 prisoners). The apprehension of these prisoners also raised a debate concerning whether they were
prisoners of war. Id. See also John Mintz, Debate Continues on Legal Status of Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
2002, at AI5 (reporting that the "Bush administration ha[d] ruled out any prospect of declaring that the al Qaeda
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resumed.4 2 They were suspended later that month43 and resumed once again in
May." By November 2002, the naval base, which not only has been identified as a
site where military commissions will convene but also as a possible terrorist penal
colony,45 was holding over 600 men from 43 countries. '
The fate of at least some of these detainees will be determined by the outcome of
proceedings before military commissions.47 Before addressing the particulars of the
President's order establishing military commissions, a brief historical overview of
their prior use is instructive.

and Taliban prisoners being held at the U.S. naval base in Cuba [we]re prisoners of war, but a debate w[ould]
resume.. .on whether to formally state that they [we]re covered by the Geneva Conventions"); John Mintz, On
Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary; Most Experts Say Al Queda Members Aren't POWs but Taliban Fighters
Might Be, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A22 (reporting that according to a number of experts in international law,
most members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda movement detained at the Guantanamo Bay naval base probably do
not deserve to be labeled prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions and legal precedents); Paisley Dodds, U.S.
Legislators Visiting Guantanamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 25, 2002 (reporting that "[sleveral governments [we]re
demanding the United States give the captives prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions, which rule[d]
out trial by military tribunal"). In February 2002, the administration declared that combatants who fought for
Afghanistan's Taliban regime and were captured would be covered by the Geneva Conventions but not deemed
prisoners of war. John Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush Shifts Position on Detainees; Geneva Conventions Cover Taliban
but Not Al Queda, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. Members of the al Qaeda terrorist network, who likewise were
not considered prisoners of war, would not be covered by the Geneva Conventions, however, since that network
was not a party to the signed accords. Id. See also Michael C. Dorf, What Is an "Unlawful Combatant," and Why
It Matters (Jan. 23, 2002), at www.findlaw.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2002) (noting that al Qaeda and Taliban
members need not be treated as prisoners of war because they do not satisfy criteria governing irregular militias
under Article IV of the Geneva Convention).
42. See U.S. Plans to Resume Flying Captives to Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at A13
(reporting how flights of captives resumed after being suspended for two weeks "pending expansion of the jail
facilities at the base").
43. See Military Flies 12 Detainees to Cuba from Afghanistan, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2002, at A18 (reporting
that, according to a military spokesperson, the military had flown twelve more detainees to the Guantanamo Bay
Navy base, the last shipment until more facilities were built).
44. See Guantanamo Bay Prison Camp Receives 21 More Detainees, WASH. POST, May 7, 2002, at A6
(reporting transport of twenty-one more al Qaeda and Taliban captives); Transfer of Captives to Cuba Base
Resumed, WASH. POST, May 2, 2002, at A13 (reporting transport of thirty-two detainees to the base, "resuming
transfers that were suspended in mid-February").
45. See John Mintz, Extended Detention in Cuba Mulled; Officials Indicate Guantanamo Bay Could Hold
Tribunals, Carry Out Sentences, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at A16.
46. See Susan Schmidt & Bradley Graham, Military Trial Plans Nearly Done; Bush to Decide Which
Detainees Will Be Tried by Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2002, at AI0; John Mintz, 4 Prisoners Sent Home;
More May Be Released, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at A15; Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The
Detainees; Guantanamo Bay Faces Sentence of Life as Permanent U.S. Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A1;
Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A10. In connection with these detentions, some of the captives housed at the base
in Guantanamo Bay filed, or had filed on their behalf, petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal court
challenging the right of the government to hold them without charges and deny them the right of access to lawyers.
In two separate cases, Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047-50 (C.D. Cal. 2001) affd in part,
rev'd in part Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding dismissal
of petition appropriate for lack of standing), and Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (appeal pending
02-CV299), district courts rejected these challenges and ruled that since the naval base in Guantanamo Bay was
located outside the sovereign territory of the United States, the courts simply had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
47. See Schmidt & Graham, supra note 46 (holding that "[tihe military proceedings currently are
contemplated only for a small number of prisoners held in camps outside the United States and would be conducted
outside this country").

Winter 2003]

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

III. HISTORY OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Military commissions 48 have their roots in the Revolutionary War.49
In 1780,
George Washington appointed a "Board of General Officers" to preside
over the
trial of Major John Andre, a British spy.50 In 1818, a military tribunal
tried two
British citizens for inciting Seminole Indian attacks on civilians in
the state of
Georgia." During the war with Mexico in the 1840s, "councils of war" were
convened to try Mexican citizens accused of violations of the law of war, 2
such as
enticing American soldiers to desert or committing guerilla warfare. 3
During the
Civil War and the reconstruction period that followed, military commissions
tried
more than two thousand cases.5 4
Most recently, military commissions were used extensively following World
War
]5
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court during that period, addressing
the

48. Generally speaking,
[t]he term "military commission" is applied to describe a military
court trial of an enemy
belligerent on charges of violation of the laws of war. A panel of military
officers typically
presides over such a proceeding, but it is distinguishable from a court
martial in that a court
martial is a trial of a member of our military forces governed by the Uniform
Code of Military
Justice.
Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justicefor War Criminalsof Invisible
Armies: A New Legal andMilitary
Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349, 367-68 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
49. See American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law,
Report and Recommendations on
Military Commissions, (Jan. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Report and Recommendations
on Military Commissions], at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2002);
William P. Barr, Former Attorney
General of the United States, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Department of Justice Oversight:
Preserving Our Freedom While Defending Against Terrorism (Nov. 28,
2001) [hereinafter Testimony of William
P. Barr], at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept-l l/barr_001.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2002).
50. See Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1,31 n.9 (1942); Report and Recommendations
on Military Commissions,
supra note 49; Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 49.
51. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 49.
52. The law of war is a subset of the law of nations. In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 7 (1945). As explained by
one commentator, the law of war
is a composite of many sources and is subject to varying interpretations
constantly adjusting to
address new technology and the changing nature of war. It may also be referred
to asjus in bello,
or law in war, which refers to the conduct of combatants in armed conflict,
as distinguished from
jus ad bellum-law before war-which outlines acceptable reasons
for nations to engage in
armed conflict. The main thrust of its principles requires that a military
objective be pursued in
such a way as to avoid needless and disproportionate suffering and damages.
Sources of the law
of war include international agreements, customary principles and rules
of international law,
judicial decisions by both national and international tribunals, national
manuals of military law,
treatises, and resolutions of various international bodies.
Jennifer Elsea, Trying Terrorists as War Criminals, CRS
Report for Congress (Oct. 29, 2001), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6270.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,
2002).
53. See Jennifer Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists
as War Criminalsbefore Military
Commissions, CRS Report for Congress, availableat http://www.nimj.org/documents/CRSreport.pdf
(updated Dec.
11, 2001); Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction
over Foreign Nationals Who Commit
InternationalCrimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996).
54. See Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, supra
note 49; Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341,345 n.8 (1951) ("'By practice dating from 1847 and renewed and
firmly established during the Civil War,
military commissions have become adopted as authorized tribunals in time
of war."') (quoting HOWLAND, DIGEST
OF OPINIONS OFTHE JUDGE-ADVOCATES GENERAL OF
THE ARMY 1066-67 (1912); Crona & Richardson, supra
note
48, at 368 (noting that "[m]ilitary commissions first had extensive use
during the Civil War",I.
55. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 48, at 369; Report and
Recommendations on Military
Commissions, supra note 49 ("Following the surrender and occupation
of Germany and Japan in 1945, military
commissions were used extensively. In Germany, over 1600 persons were
tried for war crimes by U.S. military
commissions. In the Far East nearly 1000 persons were tried by such commissions.")
(footnotes omitted).
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origins and jurisdiction of what have been described as "our common law war
courts," 56 provide a useful backdrop against which to analyze President Bush's
recent order.57 It is to an analysis of those cases that we now turn.
A. The German Saboteurs Case
In Ex Parte Quirin,58 petitioners, eight German saboteurs, entered the United
States surreptitiously after disembarking from two submarines off the Atlantic
coast. 59 Four of the men landed on Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida; the remainder
landed in Amagansett Beach on Long Island, New York.6" After landing, petitioners
buried their uniforms, as well as their supplies of explosives, fuses, and incendiary
devices, and proceeded in civilian dress to Jacksonville, Florida, and New York
City.6' Subsequently, all of the saboteurs were apprehended by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) in New York and Chicago.62
President Roosevelt appointed a military commission 63 and instructed it "to try
petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War," and the
saboteurs were turned over by the FBI to the Provost Marshal of the Military District
of Washington for trial before the commission.' 4 Petitioners thereafter challenged
their detention in applications for writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that the
President lacked statutory or constitutional authority to order that they be tried
before a military commission instead of a civilian court.65
In rejecting petitioners' contentions, the Court preliminarily outlined the various
powers granted to Congress and the President under the Constitution relating to war
and defense.' The Court reasoned that, as Commander in Chief, the President had
the "power to wage war which Congress ha[d] declared, and to carry into effect all
laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and
regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offenses against
the law of nations, including those which pertain[ed] to the conduct of war."67

56. Madsen, 341 U.S. at 346-47 (footnote omitted).
57. See William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The Tribunals; Closer Look at New Planfor Trying
Terrorists,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6 (reporting how "a Bush administration official with knowledge of the

planning said officials had been studying the World War II cases").
58. 317 U.S. at 1.
59. Id. at 21. "After the declaration of war between the United States and the German Reich, petitioners [had]
received training at a sabotage school near Berlin, Germany, where they were instructed in the use of explosives
and in methods of secret writing." Id.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The President appointed the military commission by order dated July 2, 1942. Id. at 22; see 7 Fed. Reg.
5103 (July-7, 1942).

64. 317 U.S. at 22-23.
65. Id. at 24. "It [wa]s conceded that ever since petitioners' arrest the state and federal courts in Florida, New
York, and the District of Columbia, and in the states in which each of the petitioners was arrested or detained, ha[d]
been open and functioning normally." Id. at 23-24.
66. Id. at 25-26.
67. Id. at 26.
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With respect to statutory authority, the Court noted that by its terms, Article of
War 15, then codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 1486,68 provided that nothing relating to
the laws conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial should be "construed as
depriving military commissions.. .or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions. '69 By enacting the Articles of War,
and in particular Article 15, the Court found that "Congress ha[d] explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals sh[ould] have
jurisdiction
to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate
70
cases."
Having determined that under Section 1486 Congress had exercised its power
under the Constitution "to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by
sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts
of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such
tribunals," the Court interpreted the President's decision to order the trial of
petitioners by military commission simply as reflecting an invocation of the law. 7 t
In other words, by issuing the order creating the commission, the President had
"undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also
such authority as the Constitution itself g[a]ve the Commander in Chief, to direct the
performance of those functions which may
constitutionally be performed by the
' 72
military arm of the nation in time of war.
In rejecting petitioners' contentions and ruling that it was "within the
constitutional power of the national government" to try them before a military
commission, the Court specifically declined to rule on the extent to which the
"President as Commander in Chief ha[d] constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. 73 In the case
involving petitioners, the Court held, "Congress ha[d] authorized trial of offenses
against the law of war before such commissions."7 4
As to whether the conduct engaged in by petitioners may have violated the law
of war, the Court noted that an analysis of that question centered upon the
distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants.75 The former, the Court
observed, were "subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing
military forces," while the latter were "likewise subject to capture and detention, but
in addition they [we]re subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which rendered their belligerency unlawful., 76 And in the case of petitioners, the
Court ruled that the controlling authorities "recognized that those who during time

68. The Court observed that "[bly the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593, Congress ha[d] provided
rules for the government of the Army." Id. at 26.
69. Id. at 27 (quoting Article 15).
70. Id. at 28.
71.

Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 29.
74. Id.

75. Id. at 30-31.
76. Id. at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
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of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their

uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life
or property, have
the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military
77
commission.",

In Quirin,the trial of the saboteurs occurred during a time of war.7' As discussed
below, the Supreme Court has held that offenses against the law of war may be tried
before military commissions even after the cessation of hostilities.
B. Operation ofMilitary Commissions after the Cessation of Hostilities
In Application of Yamashita,79 petitioner General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army
in the Philippine Islands, was tried and convicted before a military commission" of
violations of the law of war and sentenced to death by hanging.8 One of the
arguments raised by petitioner was that the military commission that tried him for
violations of the law of war was not lawfully convened because hostilities had
ceased between the armed forces of Japan and the United States.82
Rejecting petitioner's contention that the cessation of hostilities deprived military
commissions of jurisdiction over the trial of offenses relating to the law of war, the
Supreme Court ruled:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the
military commander, not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and
77. Id. at 35; see Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 145 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that the court in Quirin
made a distinction between lawful and unlawful belligerents and held that the latter "may be tried and punished by
military commissions according to the law of war") (internal quotation omitted).
78. 317 U.S. at 21-22.
79. 327 U.S. at 1.
80. Id. at 5. The Court in Yamashita reiterated that Article 15 was intended to maintain the recognized
common law jurisdiction of military commissions. The Court explained how Article 15 had been adopted in
response to other amendments found in the Articles of War that had conferred jurisdiction over offenders and
offenses under the law of war to court-martial and how
it was feared by the proponents of the 1916 legislation that in the absence of a saving provision,
the authority given by Articles 12, 13, and 14 to try such persons before courts-martial might be
construed to deprive the non-statutory military commission of a portion of what was considered
its traditional jurisdiction. To avoid this, and to preserve that jurisdiction intact, Article 15 was
added to the Articles.
Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 5. The bill of particulars
allege[d] a series of acts, one hundred and twenty-three in number, committed by members of
the forces under petitioner's command... [between October 9, 1944 and September 2, 1945.] The
first item specifie[d] the execution of"a deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate
a large part of the civilian population of Batangas Province, and to devastate and destroy public,
private and religious property therein, as a result of which more than 25,000 men, women and
children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated and killed, without cause
or trial, and entire settlements were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military
necessity." Other items speciffied] acts of violence, cruelty and homicide inflicted upon the
civilian population and prisoners of war, acts of wholesale pillage and the wanton destruction
of religious monuments.
Id. at 14. The Court rejected petitioner's contention that no violation of the law of war was properly presented
because the charge did not allege that he had "either committed or directed the commission of such acts." Id. The
Court determined that "the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates." Id.at 15.
82. Id.at6, 11.
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subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort, have violated the law of war. The trial and
punishment of enemy combatants who have committed violations of the law of
war is thus not only a part of the conduct of war operating as a preventive
measure against such violations, but is an exercise of the authority sanctioned
by Congress to administer the system of military justice recognized by the law
of war. That sanction is without qualification as to the exercise of this authority
so long as a state of war exists-from its declaration until peace is proclaimed."
In short, Application of Yamashita provides support for the prosecution before a
military commission of some of those detained in Guantanamo Bay, even after a
cessation of hostilities is declared.
IV. THE NOVEMBER 13TH ORDER
In support of his order establishing military commissions, President Bush relied
upon the authority vested in him by the Constitution as President and Commander
in Chief, as well as the laws of the United States, which included the congressional
and 836. '
resolution authorizing the use of force, and 10 U.S.C. Sections 821
Before presenting the competing arguments that have been advanced relating to the
constitutionality of the order, each of the authorities relied upon is briefly discussed.
A. The Constitution
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to "provide for the
3
common defense and general Welfare of the United States,"" as well as to "declare
War... and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" 6 and also "[t]o
define and punish.... [oiffenses against the Laws of Nations."" Congress also has the
power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. 8 8 Article H provides
89
that all "executive Power" under the Constitution is vested in the President.
Additionally, the President is designated the "Commander in Chief' of the armed
forces.9"

Two distinguished commentators have observed that "it is sometimes argued that
the commander-in-chief clause, read in concert with provisions vesting executive
power in the President to see that the laws are faithfully executed and peace
preserved, authorizes the President to use military force where required to protect

83. Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). Indeed, the authority of the executive in time of war to establish and
prescribe the jurisdiction and procedures governing military commissions "has been recognized, even after peace
has been declared, pending complete establishment of civil government." Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348 n. 12. See also
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950) ("The jurisdiction of military authorities, during or following
hostilities, to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of war is long-established.").
84. See Military Order, Preamble. President Bush's order apparently was modeled after President
Roosevelt's order in Quirin. See Frank J. Murray, Justice to Use FDR Precedent for Military Tribunals, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al; Rush Limbaugh, Bush's FDR Example, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A35.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
86. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cI. 11.An example of Congress exercising its authority to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations is found in the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10.
88. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.9.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IL § 1, cl.1.
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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national interests unless Congress prohibits such action."'" The Constitution, after
all, "does not delegate to Congress the power to 'conduct' war or to 'make' war; it
only delegates the power to 'declare' war."92
B. The CongressionalResolution Authorizing the Use of Force
One week after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed a joint resolution
authorizing the use of force against those responsible.93 The resolution stated in
part:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.94
Prefacing this authorization to use force was the recognition that the acts of
September 11 rendered it necessary for the United States to exercise "self-defense,"
that such acts "pose[d] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,"
and that "the President ha[d] authority under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." 95
C. The Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice
Lastly, in support of the order establishing military commissions, President Bush
relied upon Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).96
Article 21, codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 821, provides that the jurisdiction of
courts-martial to try persons subject to the UCMJ does "not deprive military
commissions.. .of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that

91. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6.9, 594 (3d. ed.
1999) (footnote omitted).

92. Id. Two other commentators have explained:
Declaring war is not tantamount to making war; indeed, the Constitutional Convention

specifically amended the working draft of the Constitution that had given Congress the power
to "make" war. When it took up this clause on August 17, 1787, the Convention voted to change

the clause from "make" to "declare." A supporter of the change argued that the new language
would "leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." In addition, other elements
of the Constitution describe "engaging" in war. This fact demonstrates that the Framers
understood "making" and "engaging" in war to be somewhat broader than simply "declaring"
war. A State constitution at the time of the ramification included provisions that prohibited the
government from "making" war without legislative approval. If the Framers had wanted to
require congressional consent before the initiation of military hostilities, they would have used
such language.
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against TerroristOrganizationsand the Nations that Harboror Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 488,
491-92 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
93. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(Sept. 18, 2001).
94. Id.
95. Id. Preamble.
96. See Military Order, supra note 1, Preamble. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted in 1950
and is found at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2003).
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by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals."97
The other provision of the UCMJ relied upon in the order was Article 36. This
article, codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 836, delegates authority to the President to
prescribe "[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof.. .for
military commissions and other military tribunals."9" Section 836 also states that in
promulgating such rules, the President "shall, so far as he considers practicable,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial
of criminal cases in the United States district court" not contrary to or inconsistent
with the UCMJ.9 9
V. DISCUSSION
Before addressing the arguments raised by the proponents and critics of the
President's order establishing military commissions, it is useful to note that, at its
core, the different positions appear to be influenced by a conceptual disagreement.
This disagreement centers on whether the criminal justice system is the appropriate
tool to use in responding to terrorist attacks of the magnitude perpetrated by al
Qaeda on September 11, particularly considering its prior history. In other words,
many "who criticize the tribunals believe that the traditional criminal justice system
is capable of protecting intelligence sources and is too important to eschew, even as
a means to combat terror.'' |°° Some, on the other hand, maintain that "we are at war
and that the criminal justice system is not designed as a weapon."'' The reality is

97. 10 U.S.C. § 821. Article 21 is identical in all material respects to its predecessor, Article of War 15,
which the Supreme Court discussed in Quirin and Yamashita. Report and Recommendation on Military
Commissions, supra note 49; see Newton, supra note 53, at 14 ("Article 21 of the current UCMJ is based on Article
of War 15.") (footnote omitted).
98. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a).
99. Id.
100. Stephen Murdoch, Civil Liberties v. National Security, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 20. See Diane F.
Orentlicher & Robert K. Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military
Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 663 (2002) (arguing that "[riecent convictions of members of the
Al Qaeda network show that U.S. courts are fully capable of meeting the challenges presented by cases involving
terrorists, including those relating to the use of classified evidence") (footnote omitted).
101. Murdoch, supra note 100, at 22. One commentator has forcefully argued:
The perpetrators of September 11 and other terrorist attacks are not morally and legally
analogous to the perpetrators of domestic crime in a settled domestic society... .The ability to
prosecute domestic crime, and the necessity of providing constitutional standards of due process,
including the extraordinarily complex rules of evidence, suppression of evidence, right to
counsel, and the rights against self-incrimination have developed within a particular political
community, and fundamentally reflect decisions about rights within a fundamentally domestic,
democratic setting in which all of us have a stake in both sides of the equation, as prosecutors
and prosecuted, because we are part of the political community which must consider both
individual rights and collective security.
It is a system, in other words, that fundamentally treats crime as a deviation from the
domestic legal order, not fundamentally an attack upon the very basis of that order. Terrorists
who come from outside this society, including those who take up residence inside this society
for the purpose of destroying it, cannot be assimilated into the structure of the ordinary criminal
trial.
Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military
Commissions and United States Policy on Detaineesat GuantanamoBay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
591, 609-10 (2002). See also Douglas W. Kmiec, Military, Not Federal,Trialsfor Terrorists, CUA LAW., Winter
2002, at 16 ("[T]errorism is not some social or cultural dysfunction capable of rehabilitation or rectification by
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that both the law model and the war model are going to be used in response to the
attack by al Qaeda.' 2 With this general backdrop in place, we now turn to the
debate.
Critics of the President's order establishing military commissions maintain that,
without authorizing congressional legislation, the use of military commissions raises
serious constitutional separation of powers concerns that may lead to reversal of
convictions emanating from such commissions.' °3 They argue that in the past
military commissions have been established when Congress had authorized such
commissions or declared war " -neither circumstance of which is present with
respect to the congressional response to the events of September 11.105 In a similar
6
vein, critics contend that the administration's reliance on Quirin is misplaced,'
since Congress had formally declared war when President Roosevelt issued his order
107
directing a military commission to try the eight German saboteurs.

ordinary law enforcement. If terrorism is a military threat, and it is, then the terrorists are more appropriately
punished by the system of military tribunals that has a long history in our nation."); John P. Elwood, Prosecuting
the War on Terrorism: The Government's Position on Attorney-Client Monitoring, Detainees, and Military
Tribunals, 17 CRIM. JUSTICE 30, 34 (2002) (maintaining that "[t]he trial of terrorists will represent more than an
effort to discipline an errant member of society for violating domestic law-it will also be an act of self-defense
against an external threat to our collective safety").
102. See David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL. Q. 9
(2002) (discussing the hybrid war-law model approach). As recognized by the American Bar Association's Task
Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants:
[t]he September II attacks were viewed as both crimes and acts of war, and the United States
has responded with both military operations and law enforcement actions. Under the
circumstances, legal doctrines and principles from both domestic criminal procedure and
international law, including the law of war, have been applied. Because of the unique nature of
the attacks and our responses to it, it is not surprising that these doctrines and principles have
been applied in new ways and have, to some extent, overlapped.
American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants-Preliminary Report (Aug. 8, 2002), at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy-combatants.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2002); Charles Lane, In Terror War,
Second Track for Suspects; Those Designated "Combatants" Lose Legal Protections,WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2002,
at AI (reporting that Administration officials maintain "parallel system is necessary because terrorism is a form of
war as well as a form of a crime, and it must not only be punished after incidents occur, but also prevented and
disrupted through the gathering of timely intelligence"); Jim Oliphant, Bush's Burden: Seeking Justice in Terror's
Wake, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 13 ("Ultimately, it is likely that an extensive military campaign will exist
side by side with a domestic prosecutorial effort.").
103. See Neal Katyal, Visiting Professor, Yale Law School (2001-02), Professor of Law, Georgetown
University, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Testimony of Neal Katyal], at http://www.law.yale
.edu/outside/html/PublicAffairs/140/katyal.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor
of Constitutional Law Harvard Law School, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 4, 2001), at
http://www.law.Harvard.edu/news/200l/l2/20_septl .html (last visited Dec. 18, 2002).
104. It is noteworthy that from the time of the adoption of the Constitution until the present, Congress has
passed only six declarations of war. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 91, § 6.9, 595. They include War of 1812,
Barbary Wars, Mexican War, Spanish-American War, World War 1, and World War II. Id. There were no
declarations of war for the Korean War in the 1950s or the war with Iraq in 1991. Id.
105. See Testimony of Neal Katyal, supra note 103; Gittins, supra note 3 ("Absent the declaration of
war.. .the president arguably has no constitutional or statutory authority to employ military commissions.").
106. Commentators have noted that "[a]lthough both the rule and reasoning of Quirin have been questioned
(at least with respect to the treatment of unlawful combatants captured in the United States), it remains the leading
American case on the use of military commissions during wartime." Casey, Rivkin & Bartram, supra note 3, at 2.
107. See Scott L. Silliman, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism,
Testimony Before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Testimony of Scott
L. Silliman], at http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/tribunal.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2002); Testimony of Neel Katyal,
supra note 103; Gittins, supra note 3. See also Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 100, at 658 (noting that "even
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With respect to the joint congressional resolution, critics make the point that
nothing contained in the resolution specifically authorized the establishment of
military commissions." 8 They note that the resolution "is patently quite far from a
declaration of war" and is limited in that it "restricts its reach only to 'force,' applies
only to persons involved in some way in the September 11 attacks, and permits such
activity 'in order to' avert prospective damage to the United States."'"' 9
Finally, insofar as the UCMJ is concerned, critics contend that Section 821 "can
only be read as reflective of Congress's intent, by enacting statutory authority for
trials by courts-martial and providing for the concurrent jurisdiction of courtsmartial with military commissions, not to divest the latter of jurisdiction that they
have by 'statute or by the Law of War '""' ° With respect to Section 836, the
argument is that the provision "has relevance only to the rules for the conducting of
military commissions, rather than to the authority for establishing them."''
On the other hand, supporters of President Bush's order maintain that because the
President's power to establish military commissions arises from the authority vested
in him by the Constitution as Commander in Chief, under the present circumstances,
no act of Congress is legally necessary to support the establishment of such
commissions."' They argue that the terrorist acts leading up to and culminating in
the attacks on September 11 leave no doubt that we are in a state of armed
conflict. 3

if the authority of Quirin were beyond question, it would provide only limited support for President Bush's order.
At most, Quirin supports the use of military commissions to try those responsible for the September 11 attacks and
others suspected of violating the laws of war that, by definition, can occur only in the course of armed conflict.").
In the Prize cases, 67 U.S. 635, (1862), the Supreme Court recognized that "war may exist without a declaration
on either side," id. at 668, and that when the conduct of another country creates a state of war with the United States,
the president "does not initiate that war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special
legislative authority." Id. Rejecting the contention that the holding in Quirin was limited to formally declared war,
the court in Padilla v. Bush, No. 02CIV445. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002) held that
the logic of that argument requires a finding that Quirin sub silento overruled the Prize cases.
... That breathtaking conclusion is unwarranted, however, both because it is unreasonable to
believe that the Court would deal so casually with its own significant precedents, and
because.. .the Prize cases have been found authoritative since Quirin, and appear to be very
much alive.
Id. at 85-86.
108. See Timothy Lynch, Director, Project On Criminal Justice, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Statement
on the Subject of Executive Branch Arrests and Trials (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Statement of Timothy Lynch],
at http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/tribunal.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002); Philip B. Heymann, James Barr Ames
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2001), at
http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/tribunal.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
109. Testimony of Neal Katyal, supra note 103; see Testimony of Scott L. Silliman, supra note 107 (noting
that "nowhere in the resolution, or in the presidential signing statement, is there any mention or characterization of
the attacks of September 11th as acts of war. They are clearly denoted as terrorist acts.").
110. Testimony of Scott L. Silliman, supra note 107; see Testimony of Neal Katyal, supra note 103 (arguing
need for a declared war before military tribunals have jurisdiction over offenses).
111. Testimony of Scott L. Silliman, supra note 107.
112. See Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Republican Member, Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism (Dec. 4, 2001),
at http://www.pict-pcti.orglnews/archivelMiltriblhatch.senjudhear. 11.28.2001 .html (last visited Dec. 18, 2002);
Elwood, supra note 101, at 34 (arguing that "the president has considerable independent authority under the
Constitution to defend the country when it has been attacked from abroad").
113. See Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State,
Opening Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 4,2001) [hereinafter Statement by Pierre-Richard
Prosper], at http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/tribunal.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002); Major General Michael J.
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Moreover, the congressional recognition that a state of armed conflict exists as
a predicate for the establishment of military commissions"' is underscored by the
language of the joint resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary means
and appropriate force" against those who committed, authorized, planned, or aided
the attacks on September 11 in order to prevent future terrorist acts." 5 Indeed,
supporters of the order contend that our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization interpreted the attacks of September 11 as acts of war because they
have invoked the mutual self-defense provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. 6 Additionally, supporters maintain that Congress has "expressly
authorized" the use of military commissions under Section 821 and that Congress
also has given the President the authority to enact procedures to be used in such
commissions under Section 836."l7
Finally, supporters of the order contend that Quirinis instructive precedent. They

maintain that similar to the German saboteurs in that case, members of al Qaeda are
"unlawful combatants" and it is that status that authorizes the "President to exercise

military power against such persons-including the use of military tribunals.""' 8

Nardotti, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, The Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1993-1997, Statement Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts "Military Commissions"
Hearing (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Statement of Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.], at http://judiciary.senate
.gov/testimony.cfm?id=129&witid=76 (last visited Dec. 18, 2002).
114. See Statement by Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 113 ("Because military commissions are
empowered to try violations of the law of war, their jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of an armed
conflict, which we have.").
115. See Statement of Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., supra note 113; Griffin B. Bell, Testimony
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Testimony of Griffin B. Bell], at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/news/archive/Miltrib/bell(formerAG).senjudhear.11.28.2OOI.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2002) (arguing that "[a]lthough we have not declared war since World War II, war has been authorized by Congress
through the authority to use armed forces as they are now being used in Afghanistan").
116. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 49; see Statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 113
(discussing NATO's response and also noting that "[t]he Organization of American States, Australia and New
Zealand activated parallel provisions in their mutual defense treaties") See also Addicott, supra note 2 (noting how
the terror attack was framed as an act of war under international law as illustrated by the fact that "for the first time
in its history.. NATO invoked its collective self-defense clause").
117. Testimony of Griffin B. Bell, supra note 115; see Elwood, supra note 101, at 35 (arguing that Section
A21 "recognizes that the president has authority to use military commissions to try offences under the law of war").
118. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 49; Statement of Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., supra
note 115. See Casey, Rivkin & Bartram, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that inasmuch as members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban can be treated as unlawful combatants, "they are subject to trial in the military commissions established by
the President's November 13 Military Order"). As Pierre-Richard Prosper, the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes
Issues at the State Department explained before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Under long established principles, the right to conduct armed conflict, lawful belligerency, is
reserved only to states and recognized armed forces or groups under responsible command.
Private persons lacking the basic indicia of organization and the ability or willingness to conduct
operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict have no legal right to wage warfare
against the state. In waging war the participants become unlawful combatants. Because the
members of al Qaeda do not meet the criteria to be lawful combatants under the law of war, they
have no right to engage in armed conflict and are unlawful combatants. And because their
intentional targeting and killing of civilians in time of international armed conflict amount to war
crimes, military commissions are available for adjudicating their specific violations of the laws
of war.
Statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 113.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The hundreds of detainees currently being held in Cuba face a number of options
during the pendency of the current armed conflict and after the hostilities that
20
brought it about cease. 19 These include prosecution before military commissions,
repatriation to their countries of origin, release if they are not determined to be law
enforcement threats, 2 l or detention until the end of hostilities. 122
IIt is well-established that "[s]ince our nation's earliest days... [military]
commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many
urgent governmental responsibilities related to war."' 23 While it has been noted that
a declaration of war, 24 or language in the joint resolution specifically authorizing
the use of military commissions,' 25 arguably would have provided the strongest legal
footing for the establishment of these commissions,
26 it is also recognized that "a state
of war may exist without a formal declaration."'
For purposes of the present discussion, it cannot be disputed that since at least
September 11, 2001, the United States and al Qaeda and its supporters have actively

119. Paisley Dodds, GuantanamoDetaineesStill There, FutureStill Uncertain,SAN MATEOCOUNTY TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2002, availableat http://www.sanmateocountytimes.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2002) (reporting that the base
eventually may hold 2000 detainees).
120. See John Mintz, Some Detainees May Be Held Even If Acquitted, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at AI5
(reporting that "U.S. officials say privately that they expect only a small number of [detainees) will face charges
before tribunals").
121. See John Mintz, 4 PrisonersSent Home; More May Be Released, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at AI5
(reporting that U.S. military authorities had released four prisoners).
122. See Seelye, Guantanamo Bay Faces Sentence of Life as Permanent U.S. Prison,supra note 46; John
Mintz, Some DetaineesMay Be Held Even If Acquitted, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7; Lee A. Casey, David
B. Rivkin, Jr. & Darin R. Bartram, By the Laws of War, They Aren't POWs, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2002, at B3;
Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A10.
Several commentators have observed:
Although it may be difficult to determine the precise point at which the "war on terrorism"
concludes, once the al Qaeda network-like the Taliban-is destroyed, the United States will
have to determine whether to try the detainees or repatriate them either to Afghanistan or to their
countries of origin. They are not entitled to the rights of and privileges of P.O.W.s, but
customary international law does require that even unlawful combatants be given a judicial
process before being "punished."
Casey, Rifkin, & Bartram, supra note 3.
123. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346 (footnote omitted). As the Court recognized in Quirin:
[an important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by military command
not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war.
317 U.S. at 28-29. See William Connelly, The Importanceof Law When America Is at War, 35 MD. B. J. 28, 30
(2002) ("Military commissions have existed, albeit under different names, since the beginning of the republic.").
124. See Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, supra note 49, at 5. See also Madsen, 343
U.S. at 348 ("In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as Commanderin-Chief of the Army and Nivy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction
and procedure of military commissions.").
125. See Testimony of Neal Katyal, supra note 103.
126. Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, supra note 49. The Court observed in Talbot
v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 (1801) that Congress can "declare a 'partial war' targeted at a particular form of
enemy aggression, even though we are not at war with the enemy nation in the traditional sense." Crona &
Richardson, supra note 48, at 360. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall explained that "[t]he whole powers
of war being, by the [C]onstitution of the United States, vested in Congress.. Congress may authorize general
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial [war], in which case the laws of
war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed." 5 U.S. at 29.
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been engaged in a war' 27 -a war declared by al Qaeda on the United States. 28 As
former Attorney General William P. Barr observed in his testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
On September 11,2001, this Nation was attacked by a highly-organized force
known as "al Qaeda." The attack cost more American lives and caused more
property damage than the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. This same
organization has declared itself at war with the United States and has stated its
intention to use any weapons at its disposal-including weapons of mass
destruction-against both civilian and military targets. Prior to September 11,
2001, al Qaeda acknowledged perpetrating armed attacks on our military
personnel, our naval ships, and our embassies. Al Qaeda operatives and their
supporters are presently engaged in the field against our own military forces in
Afghanistan. They have personnel in over 60 countries, where they are
undoubtedly poised to attack United States interests. There can be little doubt
that "cells" of this organization remain in the United States, ready to carry out
further attacks.
It is clear that a state of war exists between the United States and al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda has openly proclaimed war against the United States and has
repeatedly carried out attacks against us. The President, as Commander-in-Chief,
is empowered to take whatever steps he deems necessary to destroy this
adversary and to defend the Nation from further attack.'29
In light of those circumstances, and at the minimum, "[i]t can reasonably be argued
that Congress's authorization to use 'all necessary and appropriate force' includes
authority for the President's order, at least with respect to offenses relating to the
September 11 attacks."'"3

127. The beginning of the state of war with al Qaeda arguably can be traced to the bombings of the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But this requires that some forms of terrorism be viewed under a new legal
paradigm. As explained by Professor Ruth Wedgewood:
there are terrorist organizations whose concerted design is to violently disrupt and destroy
existing governments and commerce. Against these, one may have to entertain the paradigm of
ongoing conflict. An idealist's desire to address the root causes will not suffice against an
organization that opposes all secular regimes in the region or objects to United States protection
of essential economic and political interests. And simple reaction in the face of a completed
attack will often not be a wise or sufficient policy.
The defense of a nation-state in international war permits the targeting of the adversary's
command and control structure, military facilities, and even his supporting economic assets. This
is not a license to overrule good judgment. In limited war, the rules of engagement are care-fully
moderated to avoid broadening the conflict or drawing in other countries. While attending to
third party interests and maintaining the stability of the larger peace, one may need to place
terrorist actions within the international legal paradigm of war, rather than unbroken peace, with
a right of ongoing offensive action against an adversary's paramilitary operations and network.
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 559, 575-76 (1999).
128. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635,666, (1862) ("[I]t is not necessary to constitute a war, that both parties
should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign states."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F3d. 278, 283 (4th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing that "[tihe unconventional aspects of the present struggle do not make its stakes any less
grave").

129. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 49.
130. Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, supra note 49 (footnote omitted); see Addicott,
supra note 2 ("While issues remain to be worked out, challenging the constitutionality of military tribunals to try
the al-Qa'eda terrorists for war crimes will prove a difficult task."); Elsea, supra note 53, at 27 ("The resolution does
not address military tribunals explicitly, but could be interpreted as a broad authorization to exercise the President's
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to prosecute armed conflict.").

